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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE EX-SPOUSE AND SECTION 19

Legislative bodies have many times enacted laws which have
seemed, on the surface, to be clear and concise. When questions have
arisen as to the particular meaning of certain words or phrases used
therein, courts have been forced to interpret such terms in a manner
designed to give effect to the legislative intent. In so doing, they
have often provided definitions which, on the face of such statutes,
could scarcely be said to be encompassed within the terms used. By
so doing, courts have often laid themselves open to the accusation
that they were engaged in the process of legislating no matter how
much they concealed their attempts under the cloak of judicial interpretation.
The Illinois Supreme Court, by its action in Classen v. Heath,1
seems to have likewise so exposed itself when it expanded the phrase
"surviving spouse" as used in Section 19 of the Probate Act 2 so as to
include a surviving divorced ex-spouse. The facts of that case show
that the defendant therein obtained a divorce from her husband in
1937 upon the ground of his desertion. At that time he owned two
parcels of real estate but no stipulation was entered into with regard
to the property rights of the parties. The ex-husband died in 1942
and his estate, including such realty, was duly probated. In 1944 the
plaintiff, as administrator de bonis non with the will annexed,$ filed
a petition to sell the two parcels of real property for the purpose of
paying the decedent's debts. The divorced wife was made a party
thereto. She claimed a dower right in the land, but such claim was
resisted on the ground that, by her failure to assert her dower in the
manner and within the time fixed by Section 19 of the act, she had
lost the right thereto. From an adverse decree, the ex-spouse appealed
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court as a freehold was involved.
That court, affirming the decree of the trial court, held the phrase
"surviving spouse" as used in the statute in question was broad enough
to apply to an ex-spouse so as to require the latter to act to claim
dower within the same time and in the same manner as would be
required of a widow or widower.
1389 Ill. 183, 58 N. E. (2d) 889 (1945).
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 171, provides: "The surviving spouse of a decedent
who dies after the effective date of this Act is barred of dower unless he perfects
his right thereto by filing during his lifetime at the time and place provided for
herein a written instrument describing the real estate, signed by the surviving
spouse and declaring his intention to take dower therein."
3 The will made no provision for the ex-spouse. Her failure to renounce would
not have been regarded as an acceptance of the provisions of the will in lieu of
dower since no choice was provided: Ward v. Ward, 134 Ill. 417, 25 N. E. 1012
(1890). The rule is different today, at least as to the surviving spouse, by reason
of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 172.
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No one can dispute the fact that, if the legislature has employed
language capable of two or more constructions, it is the duty of the
courts to resolve the ambiguity by ascertaining the legislative intention 4 and applying the construction which renders the statute reasonable rather than to adopt one which leads to absurd results. 5 It is
likewise true, though, that in the absence of ambiguity there is no
occasion for construction of the statute hence the courts should apply
the same as written by the legislature. 6 There is scarcely room for
more than one construction for the term "spouse," for that term is
universally defined by the lexicographers as meaning a man or woman
who is "engaged or joined in wedlock,"'7 while the modifying adjective "surviving" connotes a spouse who outlives the other. It is only
when the prefix "ex-" is added to the word "spouse," so as to obtain
the meaning of a person who was "formerly but not now" a spouse,
that the legislative language could possibly be broad enough to apply
to the defendant in the Classen case. Despite this, the court concluded
that ambiguity was present which required construction.
From that point, the court progressed to the idea that it would
be an absurd result to grant tht ex-spouse a right of dower in the
divorced spouse's property in the absence of compliance with Section
19 while at the same time denying such right to the surviving wife
or husband. To adopt such view, the court indicated, would be fraught
,with mischievious consequences since titles might be clouded by
many dower claims in case the property owner, because of his or her
fault, was divorced more than once unless such potential clouds could
be removed within a reasonable time or were eliminated by suitable
adjustment at the time divorce was granted. The enormity of that
situation, together with the fact that to hold otherwise would result,
in the mind of the court, in giving the divorced spouse greater rights
than the surviving wife or husband, dictated a construction that the
legislature intended both to be within the comprehension of the statutory provision. Had the legislature meant otherwise, the court said,
4 Moriarty, Inc. v. Murphy, 387 Ill. 119, 55 N. E. (2d) 281 (1944) ; People ex rel.
Shriver v. Frazier, 386 I1. 615, 55 N. E. (2d) 159 (1944).
5 Moweaqua Coal Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 360 Ill. 194, 195 N. E. 607
(1935).
6 People v. Lund, 382 Ill. 213, 46 N. E. (2d) 929 (1943). To determine whether
there is ambiguity, according to Trustees of Schools v. Berryman, 325 Ill. 72 at 76,
155 N. E. 850 at 851 (1927), the language used "should be given its ordinary
meaning."
7 Webster's New Int. Dict.
See also Ballentine, Law Dict., p. 1225; 58 C. J.,
Spouse, p. 1307; Oxford Eng. Dict. on Hist. Principles, Vol. IX, p. 674. Cent. Dict.
and Encyclo., Vol. IX, p. 5859, gives as a variant: "A married person, husband
or wife; either one of a married pair." In Rossell v. State Industrial Accident
Commission, 164 Ore. 173, 95 P. (2d) 726 (1939), it was stated that the legal, as
well as the ordinary meaning of spouse is "one's wife or husband," hence a "surviving spouse" must be the one, of a married pair, who outlives the other.
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it would no doubt have used "appropriate language" to express such
intent," hence the conclusion reached appeared inevitable.
The clarification of titles to land is, undoubtedly, a matter of
serious concern and one worthy of every attention. The inherent fear
indicated by the court that a parcel of land might, for a period of
time, be encumbered by a series of dower estates, brought about by
the tendency of certain modern humans to engage in "licensed polygamy," is not unwarranted. But there is scarcely justification for
such a decision either in precedent 9 or logic and had more thought
been given to underlying principles the fallacies inherent therein
might have been recognized. The question goes much deeper than
one as to the manner of splitting hairs over the meaning of words.
It really grows out of the many changes made, in recent years, in an
endeavor to provide a suitable substitute for the common-law right
of dower.
That common-law right gave to the widow, upon her husband's
death, an interest in one-third of the lands and tenements of which
he was seized in fee simple or fee tail for the remainder of her life. 10
It was a right of such antiquity that its origin is difficult to trace, but
in this country, except where changed by statute, it remains the same
or substantially the same as at common law. The husband, on the
other hand, obtained no such right in his wife's property although he
did receive something comparable thereto. With the enactment of the
Married Women's Acts, it was felt that there was no just basis for
discriminating between the spouses, so the husband's estate of curtesy
s The courts

developed and applied the maxim

eopressio uniu8 e8t ezclusio

alterius to fit such situations: People ex rel. Hansen v. Collins, 351 Ill. 551, 184 N. E.

641 (1933). In the light thereof, it is hardly to be expected that the legislature,
when using the term "spouse," would be expected to add "and we don't mean 'exspouse' !"
9 In Wait v. Wait, 4 N. Y. 95 (1850), a woman who had obtained an absolute
divorce on the ground of her husband's adultery was allowed a dower right in his
property such as was given to the "widow" by statute on the ground that there
was no just basis for denying the same to the innocent spouse although the statute expressly denied such right to a guilty one. The court said, at p. 107, that
whether or not a woman divorced from her husband, upon his subsequent death,
was to be called his "widow" might "furnish a curious question in philology," but
concluded that the language used was sufficient to describe the person intended.
In a later case, People v. Faber, 92 N. Y. 1460, 44 Am. Rep. 357 (1883), the court
indicated that the New York legislature sometimes used the terms "husband" and
"wife" to refer to persons actually divorced. In Illinois, however, as was noted
by the court in the instant case, the phrase "husband or wife surviving," used in
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 52, § 2, dealing with homestead rights, has been held not
to apply to divorced persons: Krusemark v. Stroh, 385 Ill.64, 52 N. E. (2d) 156
(1944) ; Claussen v. Claussen, 279 Ill. 99, 116 N. E. 693 (1917); Stahl v. Stahl,
114 Ill. 375, 2 N. E. 160 (1885). So, too, in Indiana, the surviving ex-spouse has
been denied the right to a statutory share in the estate of the deceased property
owner on the ground that she was neither "widow" nor "surviving wife" within
the contemplation thereof: Fletcher v. Monroe, 145 Ind. 56, 43 N. E. 1053 (196).
10 Stribling v. Ross, 16 Ill. 121 (1854).
See also Tiffany, Real Property, 3d ed.,
§ 487; Kent, Comm., IV, *35; Blackstone, Comm., II, 129.
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was abolished'1 and each spouse was given a like estate, denominated
"dower," in the other's property. That estate, which might be designated as statutory dower, was still only a life estate and of uncertain
value until still later statutory modifications resulted in treating the
12
surviving spouse as an heir and entitled to an interest in the fee.
The statutory estate thus created, however, was given to the surviving
spouse only after the debts of the deceased spouse had been paid so
the legislature saw fit to perpetuate the estate of dower, with its
freedom from claims of creditors, in case the surviving spouse preferred to receive it in lieu of the statutory estate of inheritance.
There being a choice open to the surviving spouse, it was not unreasonable to force an election between the two types of estates. That
was the evident purpose of the legislature in enacting Section 19 of
the Probate Act for through it the surviving spouse is forced to take
the statutory estate of inheritance with its attendant consequences
unless he or she takes affirmative action to obtain the common-law
interest.
There is a vast difference, however, between compelling an election among two or more beneficial interests on the one hand, as in the
case of the surviving spouse, and the situation presented in cases
where the parties were once married but were subsequently divorced.
As dower originally arose out of the marital relationship and required
a legally recognized ceremony for its existence, it naturally disappeared upon an absolute divorce.' 2 Such would be the rule today but
for the fact that the legislature has provided by another section of
the Probate Act that a spouse who is divorced for the fault of the
other does not forfeit the right of dower which grew out of the
marriage which once existed.' 4 The "dower" there referred to is the
ancient common-law estate and is not a privilege to take an interest
in the fee. The innocent ex-spouse is not made an heir thereby but,
on the other hand, is not entirely penalized because the marriage has
failed. True such right is inchoate while the former spouses both
live. It is a mere expectation of property and may be changed, modi11 R. S. 1874, p. 423, § 1. The same idea is expressed in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch.
3, § 170.
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 162.
is Co. Litt., Liber II, Ch. XIX, *33b, states: "But if they were divorced a vinculo
matrimonii in the life of her husband, she loseth her dower." See also Vernier,
American Family Laws, Vol. II, p. 215. Provision in lieu of dower is destroyed
by divorce for the fault of the wife according to Jordan v. Clark, 81 Il. 465 (1876),
but not if the decree is obtained by her: Seuss v. Schukat, 358 I1. 27, 192 N. E.
668, 95 A. L. R. 1461 (1934). The same rule applied to the husband's estate of
curtesy: Howey v. Goings, 13 Ill. 95 (1851).
That statute has its origin In R. L. 1827,
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, § 173.
p. 185.
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fled, or abolished by legislative action at any time. 15 It may be regulated by law, and will be governed by the law in force at the time of
the death of the property owner. 16 The defendant in the instant case
had procured her divorce in 1937, but between the date of the decree
and the death of the husband, the legislature had enacted Section 19
of the Probate Act. Undoubtedly, if such statute applied to the defendant, she would have to comply with its provisions respecting the
filing of a claim for dower within the period allotted. But wherein
would lie the sense of compelling the innocent divorced spouse to
make a choice such as is contemplated by that section when there
are no alternatives to choose between?
If the legislature wished to prevent the ex-spouse, no matter how
innocent, from claiming dower at all, then the thing to do was not to
enact Section 19 of the Probate Act but rather to repeal Section 21
from which that right stems. If any qualification ought to be placed
thereon, it should be done by modifying that section rather than by
misappropriating the sense of another provision having no real relation thereto. It well may be that, for the safety of titles, the exspouse who is entitled to claim dower should be barred from the same
unless the right thereto is asserted in a positive and prompt manner.
That, however, as the courts have often said, is an "argument to be
addressed to the legislature." That objective could be simply and
quickly attained if the legislature felt it was a desirable one. Its
accomplishment in the manner laid down by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Classen case, though, is neither sound nor sensible.
H.
A

YEAR OF

H.

FLENTYE

S. E. U. A.

The decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association' has been generally recognized as the most important
opinion handed down by the United States Supreme Court during
its 1943-4 term. 2 One can well agree that such decision has farreaching consequences for it upset a constitutional law doctrine of
seventy-five years' standing,3 has required legislative attention by
every state in the Union, has produced Congressional action, and in
1 Sutherland v. Sutherland, 69 Ill. 481 (1873); Kauffman v. Peacock, 115 Ill.
212, 3 N. E. 749 (1885) ; Virgin v. Virgin, 189 Ill. 144, 59 N. E. 596 (1901) ; Mettler
v. Warner, 243 Ill. 600, 90 N. E. 1099, 134 Am. St. Rep. 388 (1910); Bennett V.
Bennett, 318 Il. 193, 149 N. E. 292 (1925) ; Kilgore v. Kilgore, 319 Ill. 298, 149
N. E. 754 (1925) ; Steinhagen v. Trull, 320 Ill. 382, 151 N. E. 250 (1926) ; Mitchell
v. Mitchell, 328 Ill. 136, 159 N. E. 274 (1927).
16 Dial v. Dial, 378 Ill. 276, 38 N. E. (2d) 43 (1941).
1322 U. S. 533, 64 S. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944). A related issue is treated
in Polish Nat. Alliance, etc. v. National Labor Rel. Board, 322 U. S. 643, 64 S. Ct.
1196, 88 L. Ed. 1509 (1944).
2 "Supreme Court, 1943-4 A Significant Term" (The Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc.)
p. 18.
' Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).
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general has left the insurance business as a whole in an unsettled state
of affairs. In the light thereof, a survey of some of the specific effects
of the decision, one year after its pronouncement, may be warranted.
. So far as the case itself is concerned, the federal grand jury for
the Northern District of Georgia indicted the South-Eastern Underwriters Association upon a charge of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. 4 That association was composed of two hundred private
stock fire insurance companies and twenty-seven officers. The indictment alleged that the association fixed premium rates and agent's
commissions, employed various types of coercion to force non-member
companies into the conspiracy, and attempted to compel those seeking
insurance to buy from the association members only. The government
contended that the Sherman Act was violated by such conduct as the
same amounted to a restraint of interstate trade and commerce and
also created a monopoly in at least six of the states. The association
demurred on the ground that the fire insurance business was not, and
never had been, commerce. That demurrer was sustained by the district court upon the ground advanced. 5 A writ of error was granted
to the prosecution by the United States Supreme Court. 6 Some thirtyfive of the states filed briefs as amici curiae seeking affirmance of the
lower court decision, but the Supreme Court, by a four-to-three decision, 7 reversed the trial court and held that the business of insurance
is a form of commerce and, when conducted across state lines, is the
proper subject of federal regulation. 8
By such decision, the nation's largest business was rendered subject to federal jurisdiction although the regulation thereof had
hitherto been handled by the states. The implications of numerous
decisions, beginning with Paul v. Virginia,9 were necessarily over"Every contract, combination in the form of trust
4 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 declares:
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal." Section 2 thereof
states:

"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine

or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor."
5 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712 (1943).
6 Authority for such action, in criminal cases, is to be found in 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 682.
7 Justices Roberts and Reed did not participate in the decision of the case.
8 Mr. Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, concurred in by Justices Douglas,
Murphy and Rutledge.
9 75 U. S. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869). The principles thereof were applied in
Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U. S. 4'10, 19 L. Ed. 972 (1871) ; Liverpool & London Life &
Fire Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 77 U. S. 566, 19 L. Ed. 1029 (1871) ; Fire Association of
Philadelphia v. New York, 119 U. S. 110, 7 S. Ct. 108, 30 L. Ed. 342 (1886) ; Hooper
v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895) ; Noble v. Mitchell,
164 U. S.. 367, 17 S. Ct. 110, 41 L. Ed. 472 (1896); Nutting v. Massachusetts, 183
U. S. 553, 22 S. Ct. 239, 46 L. Ed. 324 (1902) ; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Wisconsin, 247 U. S. 132, 38 S. Ct. 444, 62 L. Ed. 1025 (1918); Bothwell v.
Buckbee-Mears Co., 274 U. S. 274, 48 S. Ct. 124!, 72 L. Ed. 277 (1927) ; Colgate v.
Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 80 L. Ed. 299 (1935).
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ruled although not specifically rejected. In that regard, one factor
should be noted and that is that such earlier decisions had all involved
the validity of state statutes. The court may have felt that it did not
wish to invalidate such statutes inasmuch as Congress had fashioned
no regulation for the insurance business. To deny validity to such
statutes in retrospect would have given insurance companies, conducting a business inherently affected with a public interest, a free hand
to do as they pleased. Such prior opinions, moreover, were based on
the doctrine that each state could decide just what qualifications a
foreign company must meet in order to do business within the state,
for while corporations were "persons" under the due-process clause
they were not "citizens" within the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. That doctrine, doubtless, the court
did not wish to overthrow., The instant case, though, does constitute
the first wherein the United States Supreme Court was asked to rule
on the insurance business as it might be affected by an act of Congress, and the majority opinion has now made such business subject to
federal regulation whereas the states, prior thereto, had regulated it
exclusively.
What, then, did the decision do to the insurance business? It was,
apparently, placed in a sort of no-man's land subject to attack from
both fronts. If it continued to abide by state regulations, it was open
to attack for such regulations, in many cases, could be said to tend in
the direction of a monopoly of trade so as to burden the free flow of
commerce. On the other hand, companies doing business in foreign
states might refuse to comply with all forms of state regulation on
the ground that they were subject only to federal control. 10 Practical considerations regarding the uncertain status of the insurance
business with respect to regulation may have been the basic reason
for the strong dissents written by Justices Stone, Frankfurter and
Jackson.
Chief Justice Stone, one of the dissenters, although admitting
that Congress could regulate many aspects of the insurance business,
forecast that the effect of the decision would be to take away from
the states and to confer on the federal government the regulation of
a business already well-regulated under state laws and subject it to
the uncertainties of Congressional action. Justice Jackson, agreeing
that the conduct of insurance business across state lines actually
amounts to interstate commerce, nevertheless advanced the theory
that a fiction had been established to the effect that insurance should
lo See Keehn v. Hi-Grade Coal & Fuel Co., 23 N. J. Misc. 102, 41 A. (2d) 525
(1945), where it was argued that the S. E. U. A. decision had rendered Invalid

certain provisions of the New Jersey insurance law, but the same were upheld an
not amounting to a violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
Other aspects of the situation are dealt with in Brown v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 53
N. Y. S. (2d) 760 (1945), and McCarthy v. American Surety Co., 52 N. Y. S. (2d)

601, 183 Misc. 983 (1944).
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not be considered as ordinary commerce. In his desire to maintain
that theory so as to avoid the practical consequences of the decision,
Mr. Justice Jackson declared: "The states began nearly a century
ago to regulate insurance, and state regulation, while no doubt of
uneven quality, today is a successful going'concern. Several of the
states, where the greatest volume of business is transacted, have
rigorous and enlightened legislation, with enforcement and supervision in the hands of experienced and competent officials. Such state
departments, through trial and error, have accumulated that body of
institutional experience and wisdom so indispensable to good administration. The Court's decision at very least will require an extensive
overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and supervision.
The whole legal basis will have to be reconsidered. What will be
irretrievably lost and what may be salvaged no one now can say,
and it will take a generation of litigation to determine. Certainly the
states lose very important controls and very considerable revenues."'"
Justice Frankfurter also expressed agreement with his dissenting
brethren, for he too did not want to ".

.

. wipe out elaborate and long-

established state systems for regulating and taxing insurance companies."12
As could be anticipated from a reading of the dissenting opinions,
the decision was not generally well received either in the insurance
field or in the public press. One editorial stated that "Insurance D
Day fell just a few hours before Eisenhower's D Day . . . the mental

commotion of insurance men was pitiable, as their attention was torn
between invasion headlines and their efforts to apprehend the consequences of the epochal, adverse U. S. Supreme Court decision . . .
Decisions upon which the whole system of state supervision of insurance has been founded and under which the business has operated
apparently are juridical museum pieces."' 3 The Insurance Commissioner for Massachusetts' 4 likewise expressed the sentiment of state
insurance officials when he commented that "a discussion of the
decision . . . should be periodically revised as the mischief which
flows from [it] manifests itself from time to time . . . If Mr. Justice

Black and his associates could have seen their way clear to accept
Mr. Justice Jackson's view, insurance supervisory officials and insurance executives would have been spared much grief and the public
would have been saved the increased cost of insurance which flows
from costly litigation."'15
11 322 U. S. 533 at 590, 64 S.Ct. 1162 at 1192, 88 L. Ed. 1440 at 1478.
12 Charles Stuart Lyon, "Old Statutes and New Constitution," 44 ol. L. Rev. 599
at 634 (1944).
13 The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., June 9, 1944, p. 1.
14 Charles F. J. Harrington, past president (1943-4)
of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners and chairman of its Federal Legislation Committee.
15 Harrington, "An Exploration of the Effects of the S. E. U. A. Decision," 261
Ins. L. J. 590 at 590-1 (1944).
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Although such comments came from those primarily interested
in the insurance business, many constitutional lawyers of note were
of the same frame of mind. Professor Powell, as if speaking for them,
attacked the majority opinion with fine astuteness. After deducing
that Mr. Justice Black's decision was based on the major premise
that most people would hold insurance to be a form of trade and
commerce, he pointed out that it was "a little less than shocking to
have a Justice of the Supreme Court invoke the mere supposition of
common knowledge among lesser breeds without the law as worthy
of consideration against the conclusion of a district court which
preferred to respect its obligation to be faithful to superior controlling precedents rather than to traduce them by resort to vaguely
indicated ancient locutions and to unspecified contemporary supposed
common knowledge of supposed most persons."' 16
There were those, however, who approved. Hugh Evader Willis,
long an advocate of the belief that insurance is interstate commerce
and a severe critic of Paul v. Virginia, rejoiced in the decision and
stated that: "The present United States Supreme Court has overruled
another prior Supreme Court decision .

fine piece of work.'

17

.

. and in doing so has done a

The S. E. U. A. decision brought forth a volley of comments pro
and con, mostly con, which indicated the seriousness of the situation
created thereby. Meanwhile, what about the subject of all this discussion? What was the insurance business doing to remove itself
from the horns of the dilemma? Action was obviously necessary to
clarify the status of ,the business and it was not long before action
made its appearance. The general set-up became apparent almost immediately. The fire and casualty companies indicated they would work
with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in an attempt to persuade Congress to take action granting relief from the
effects of the decision. A few days after the decision had been
handed down, several hundred representatives of the insurance business met in Chicago to discuss the new situation. They recommended
that a special committee should consult all interested persons, should
hold executive sessions as well as public hearings throughout the
country, and should submit specific recommendations to the executive
committee of that association before September 1st. Life insurance
companies, on the other hand, appeared to remain aloof, probably on
the ground that they had nothing to fear from antitrust regulations.
Even before the decision had been announced, duplicate bills had
been introduced in the Senate and the House of Representatives on
September 20, 1943, designed to exempt insurance from the operation
See Powell, "Insurance as Commerce," 57 Harv. L. Rev. 937 at 988 (1944).
Willis, "United States of America v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,"
258 Ins. L. J. 390 (1944).
16

17
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of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.18 These measures had been discussed in committee and representatives of the various insurance
interests had been heard, but the popular impression was that the
administration was holding up serious consideration. The S. E. U. A.
decision brought action, however, and the Walter-Hancock bill was
passed in the House by a vote of 283 to 54. The Senate bill, discussed in committee and before the insurance subcommittee during
the same week, was not reported out, no doubt because of the announcement by the Attorney General that neither he nor the Department of Justice were considering action against the insurance business until both the states and Congress had had an opportunity to
take appropriate action.' 9 At that time, Congress recessed and it
appeared certain that Senate action, either on its own or the House
bill, would not be taken until after election.
Beginning in July, 1944, the federal legislation committee of the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners conducted meetings
with the committees chosen by the varied insurance interests. 20 All
interested organizations or persons were invited to make suggestions,
and recommendations agreed upon by that committee were to be submitted to the executive committee of the N. A. I. C. for consideration.
The programs offered were many and varied. Predominant, however,
was the idea that in lieu of pressure for the passage of the Senate
Bailey-Van Nuys bill, passage thereof becoming less likely every day,
there should be substituted a plan for a moratorium on the application
of federal statutes regulating interstate commerce as applied to the
insurance business. In particular, the Sherman and Clayton acts, the
Federal Trade Commission act, and the Robinson-Patman acts were
to be suspended, for the time being, as they might relate to insurance
matters. The suggestion particularly appealed to the life insurance
interests and was one on which they found a common ground with
the others for the president of one of the larger life insurance companies asserted that his company's sole concern was only over the
possible application of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 2 1 Concern
over jthe possibility that that Commission, possessed of a seemingly
unlimited power to enter any field and say what is unfair competition
and what is a deceptive act or practice, might undertake to test insurance practices can well be understood.
is S. 1362 is frequently referred to as the Bailey-Van Nuys bill, while H. &L 3270
has been designated the Walter-Hancock bill.
19 90 Cong., Rec., June 23, 1944, p. 6694. The statement of thp Attorney General
appears in the appendix to that issue at pp. A3632-3.
2o As, for example, the Association of Life Insurance Presidents, Insurance Executives Association, Eastern Underwriters Association, Association of Casualty and
Surety Executives, National Bureau of Casualty and Surety Underwriters, and
others.
21 See statement by Leroy A. Lincoln, president of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., In
The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., Aug. 25, 1944, p. 2.
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Following such meetings, the executive committee of the
N. A. I. C. adopted four of the recommendations of its legislation
committee. Those recommendations called for (1) a declaration by
Congress that the regulation and taxation of the insurance business
should continue in the several states; (2) the complete elimination
of the insurance business from the scope of the Federal Trade Commission Act; (3) the total elimination thereof from the operation of
the Robinson-Patman Act; and (4) the partial elimination of restraints imposed by the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 22 That body also

directed its legislation committee to work with representatives of the
industry in sponsoring federal legislation.
Shortly thereafter, the Bailey-Van Nuys bill was given favorable
recommendation by the Senate judiciary committee and was submitted
to the Senate, but as a recess was about due it was uncertain as to
just when the bill would receive consideration. A minority report
of the judiciary committee contained a motion by Senator O'Mahoney
requesting that no action be taken until after the September meeting
of the insurance commissioners. Senator O'Mahoney there stressed
the fact that the Bailey-Van Nuys bill, while it would exempt the
insurance business from the antitrust laws, would not relieve the
industry from the operation of other federal statutes which were likewise based on the commerce clause. He urged, instead, that the state
commissioners' recommendations be made the basis for legislation. 23
State officials and insurance concerns, fire and casualty companies
in particular, had been hoping that a rehearing in the Supreme Court
would prove more favorable to their cause than the original decision.
Such hopes were blasted, however, when the United States Supreme
Court, on October 9, 1944, denied the petition for rehearing. For a
while, some hope was fastened on the idea of a constitutional amendment by which the insurance business might be declared exempt from
the effect of the commerce clause. For all practical purposes, though,
any solution of the problem would have to come from Congress in
whose lap the matter now rested.
Meanwhile, the legislation committee of the N. A. I. C. met again
in early November and drafted a proposed statute similar to the one
it had recommended earlier but with an additional provision calling
for a moratorium, until July 1, 1948, on the Sherman and Clayton
anti-trust laws except as the same related to coercion and boycotts.
It was planned, thereby, to give the states an opportunity to make
whatever changes might be necessary in the light of the S. E. U. A.
decision. That draft was drawn with comparatively little opposition
22 John M. McFall, "A Calendar of the 'S. E. U. A.' Case," 265 Ins. L. J. 72 at
73 (1945).
23 As reported in The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., Sept. 22, 1944, p. 1.
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and was approved at the midyear meeting held on December 4, 1944,
24
between the representative insurance and state associations.
The Senate had remained quiescent in the matter from the time
when the Bailey-Van Nuys bill had been reported out of the judiciary
committee, perhaps for the reason that all insurance interests had not
agreed on a legislative proposal by which the industry might be
governed. 2 5 The companies and the insurance commissioners realized
that a united front was necessary if they were to convince the Senate
of the appropriateness of their recommendations and they strove to
provide one. By December 13th all insurance interests agreed that
the proposed legislation should stand except that a portion of it,
exempting application of the Sherman Act after the moratorium,
should be deleted. Senators McCarron and Ferguson introduced this
amended proposal as a substitute for the Bailey-Van Nuys bill three
days later.26 At the same time, Senators O'Mahoney and Hatch submitted a proposal, carrying the endorsement of the N. A. I. C. and the
insurance industry with the exception of the stock fire companies,
limiting the moratorium from the antitrust laws to March 1, 1946.
The following day Congress adjourned, having failed to take action
on the several proposals. The 79th Congress was due to convene in.
January, however, and the ball would start rolling anew.
The new year began with a letter from the President to Senator
Radcliffe wherein the policy of the administration was declared to be
one not to interfere with state regulation and taxation, but to insist
that insurance should not be immune from antitrust legislation. The
O'Mahoney-Hatch bill, introduced in the prior Congress, was openly
approved. 27 On January 6, 1945, Senator O'Mahoney introduced substantially the same bill as he had offered earlier. Shortly thereafter,
Senators McCarron and Ferguson introduced S. B. 340 which was
similar to their former proposal. Their bill called for a moratorium
on the operation of the Sherman Act until June 1, 1947, and a more
extended one on the Clayton Act to January 1, 1948. It was submitted more or less as a compromise substitute for the O'MahoneyHatch bill, and had the approval of the N. A. I. C. and the insurance
industry as a whole. The Senate judiciary committee reported a
recommendation that the bill pass and it was passed on January 25th
24 At that meeting the N. A. I. C., the state commissioners, the American Life
Convention, the Life Insurance Association of America, the Association of Mutual
Casualty Companies and others were represented. See The Nat. Underwriter, Life
Ins. Ed., Dec. 8, 1944, p. 6.
25 Stock fire insurance companies had not approved the N. A. I. C. legislative
draft.
26 McFall, op. cit., p. 73.
27 See letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Radcliffe, dated Jan. 2, 1945,
quoted in full in 264 Ins. L. J. 22 (1945).
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with but one change, namely: that the antitrust laws should not be
25
excepted under Section 2(B) of the statute.
No action of any kind had been taken in the House, perhaps because its membership was waiting to see what took place in the
Senate. A few days after the Senate had voted on its bill, the subcommittee of the House judiciary committee recommended the passage thereof without the change made on the Senate floor, and without
the declaration of the intent of Congress to provide a moratorium.
Such bill was not favorably received by the Senate or the insurance
industry. Senator O'Mahoney, in fact, protested that the House
amendments would "kill the bill" if attempt was made to exempt
insurance completely from the antitrust laws.2 9 Nevertheless, the bill
did pass the House on February 14th by a vote of 315 to 57.
Because of the absence of agreement between House and Senate
measures, the matter went before a joint conference committee which
eventually agreed upon a conference report. That report was different from the House bill chiefly because it included the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Robinson-Patman Acts within the
moratorium period, and expressly stipulated that there was to be no
exemption for acts of boycott, coercion or intimidation. The report
received approval in both branches of Congress and the amended
measure was sent to the White House where, on March 9th, it was
signed and became law.30 It is the only measure thus far which has
been enacted into law but it is obviously not a solution to the problems created by the S. E. A. U. decision. It merely postpones the
necessity for present affirmative action by Congress for almost three
years in order that the states might change existing laws to conform
to the decision.
28 Before amendment from the Senate floor, that section read:
"No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted
by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which
imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such act specifically so provides."
The amendment placed the words "except the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended,
known as the Clayton Act" after the words "No Act of Congress" at the beginning
of the section.
29 As quoted in The Nat. Underwriter, Life Ins. Ed., Feb. 9, 1945, pp. 1 and 22.
20 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1011 et seq. Section 1 of the statute declares the
Congressional purpose that continued regulation and taxation of the business of
insurance by the states is in the public Interest and Congressional silence is not to
be construed to impose barriers on state regulation. Section 2(a) expressly states
that existing state laws remain in operation. Section 2(b) indicates that state'
laws are to continue in effect unless a federal statute is enacted which specifically
relates to the insurance business. It, and Section 3(a), contain moratorium provisions. The moratorium on the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the RobinsonPatman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, extends to January 1, 1948,
except that there is no moratorium on the provisions of the Sherman Act relating
to boycotts, coercion or intimidation. Section 4 states that existing federal legislation on labor matters has full application to the insurance business. A definition
of the term "state" is furnished in Section 5, and Section 6 contains the customary
separability clause.
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The burden, therefore, is now on the states. The bill granted
the premise that regulation by the states is in the public interest.
The states, however, are to retain control only if they can prove their
ability to control before January 1, 1948. Before that date, it is
expected that state action of all kinds will occur. Hasty legislation,
radical changes, refusal to change, good measures and bad will likely
appear. It appears too much to hope that forty-eight states will pass
legislation adequate, in Congressional judgment, to free the insurance
industry from imminent federal control. Test cases of various state
measures will undoubtedly arise, but the present prospect seems to
be that lack of uniformity of action will eventually give Congress
sufficient excuse to take over all-out regulation of the insurance business. State failure to provide adequate regulation for transportation
led to the Interstate Commerce Commission. A federal Insurance
Commission appears looming on the horizon.
R. K. POWERS

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERROR-REQUISITES AND PROCEEDINGS FOR TRANSFER OF
CAUSE-WHETHER OR NOT FILING OF MOTION IN TRIAL COURT TO VACATE
JUDGMENT OR DECREE OPERATES TO STAY RUNNING OF TIME FOR FILING

OF NOTICE OF APPEAL-A motion was made, in Corwin v. Rheims,' to

dismiss an appeal on the ground that the same had not been taken in
apt time. The original decree from which relief was sought had been
entered on February 2, 1944. Six days later, the unsuccessful plaintiff
moved to vacate such decree which motion was continued generally
and was not passed upon until May 19, 1944, when it was overruled.
Three days after the order overruling the motion to vacate the decree,
notice of appeal was filed in the trial court. It was urged that since
such notice was not filed within ninety days next following the date
of the original decree, as provided in Section 76 of the Civil Practice
Act, 2 the appeal was taken too late to warrant consideration thereof.
Held: motion to dismiss the appeal denied.
The intimation contained in Defbler v. Bernard Brothers, Incorporated,3 to the effect that a motion to vacate a judgment does not
operate to stay the running of time within which to file notice of

appeal, was clarified in the instant case when it was pointed out that
the rule therein announced was proper in view of the fact that, subsequent to the filing of such motion and before the same had been
determined, the appellant had filed a notice of appeal. Such action
1390 Ill. 205, 61 N. E. (2d) 40 (1945). Gunn, J., dissented over questions not
involved herein.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 200.
s 38 I1. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Il1. App. 504, 48 N. E. (2d)
422 (1943).

